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The most commonly used method for gauging public opinion in societies is the polling of voting-age citizens. This textbook 
tool, however, is often denied to analysts of countries such as Tajikistan where governments are suspicious of polls, 
infrastructure for extensive polling of public opinion is lacking, and the rare polls that are conducted often return suspiciously 
nonsensical results. This brief article suggests that social media presents an alternative indicator of public opinion in societies 
such as Tajikistan’s. The article outlines the predominant contours of the social media discussion of the November 6, 2013 
presidential elections in the country, illustrating what an analysis of social media can add to our understanding of public 
opinion in places where pre-election polls are not an option. 
Do Social media matter? 
There are obviously major limits to treating online activity as a reliable gauge of the offline political preferences and behavior of 
the Tajikistani public. First, the predominantly urban-based, middle-class, well-educated, and computer-literate users of social 
media, some of whom live abroad, are not necessarily representative of the country’s population as a whole. Second, while it is 
possible to count and interpret texts and multimedia content shared on social media, it is virtually impossible to measure the 
opinion of a broader audience of users who observe the discussion without participating in it. Third, the data collected by 
analyzing social media is rendered somewhat unreliable by the fact that users are more likely to discuss something with which 
they disagree rather than something they agree with. Fourth, the range of opinions represented in social media might be 
limited due to self-censorship as the intensification of government efforts to monitor online activity prompting some users to 
become more cautious in what they write and how they comment. Fifth, even when internet users discuss political topics, join 
groups, or share certain texts or images, this does not always accurately predict their actual offline behavior. Finally, there is the 
problem of a selection bias introduced by the fact that (a) some posts and comments on popular social media platforms and 
news forums are moderated, and (b) analysts are necessarily constrained by the amount of text they can access, and they are 
often biased as to which bits of online discussion they deem worth looking at. 
Yet, even if social media is an imperfect indicator of public opinion, it is probably 
the best indicator available in a country like Tajikistan. Social media is the only 
place where a meaningful, broad-based discussion of the November 2013 
presidential election is taking place. With less than three weeks left before the 
presidential vote at the time of writing, there were few signs of an electoral 
competition or discussion of political alternatives taking place in Tajikistan. 
State-run television, which remains the key source of political information for 
most people in the country, did not change its programming nor allot airtime to 
On November 6 Tajik citizens will go to the polls in the Presidential election. With the only genuine 
opposition candidate Oinihol Bobonazarova being forced out of the race in October, the incumbent 
Emomali Rahmon is widely expected to win another term. Despite the election being seen as a foregone 
conclusion by many, a relatively lively debate on the state of politics in Tajikistan has developed online 
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anyone except the incumbent president. Local radio stations largely disregarded the elections. There was a good deal of 
election-related discussion in newspapers, but the readership of Tajikistani newspapers is significantly smaller than the users of 
social media. Besides, many of newspaper articles reached a wider audience when they were shared via social media. 
In addition, the distance between an “average” social media user and an “average” citizen 
is narrowing in Tajikistan. While estimates of the number of internet users in the country 
differ1, there is little doubt that the percentage of individuals using the internet relative to 
the general population has increased.2 The number of Tajikistani bloggers and users of 
social networks has been on the rise, while the amount of political discussion on these 
platforms as well as on news forums has noticeably increased. Hence, social media users 
are increasingly more representative of the general public in Tajikistan. 
The Coverage of the Upcoming Elections in Social Media 
The following brief description of the political preferences of Tajikistani social media users is based on the author’s observation 
of online activity which occurred on two most popular social-networking platforms in the country (Facebook and 
Odnoklassniki), a small group of blogs and Twitter accounts run by Tajikistanis, and in the comments sections of two popular 
news websites which offer independent political reporting (news.tj, ozodi.org). The observation spans the period between 
August 1, 2013, and October 15, 2013. Slightly more than half of all posts and comments explored were in Russian, with the rest 
being in Tajik. 
There was almost no discussion of the upcoming presidential vote in the social media in August, apart from several Facebook 
users sharing images of Muhiddin Kabiri and Rahmatillo Zoirov, the leaders of the opposition Islamic Revival Party (IRPT) 
and Social-Democratic Party (SPT) respectively, and suggesting that they would make good presidents. It became evident by 
early August that Russia-based Tajikistani opposition movements, Group-24 and Vatandor, or their sympathizers in the 
country were controlling “Platforma”, at that time largest and most popular Facebook group dedicated to discussing politics in 
Tajikistan. Discussion in the group became noticeably skewed in favor of posts and memes heavily criticizing the government 
of President Emomali Rahmon, while praising Umarali Quvvatov, the leader of Group-24 detained by the United Arab 
Emirates on an extradition request issued by Tajikistan, and Zaid Saidov, a former industry minister arrested in Dushanbe on 
a number of charges shortly after founding a new opposition party. Several active members of the group left “Platforma” after 
complaining publicly that the moderators were managing the discussion on the page, refusing to publish some posts and 
deleting others. Group-24 also came to dominate the political discussion among 
Tajikistani groups on Odnoklassniki, where comments and political memes 
identical to those on “Platforma” were posted. Despite the heavy presence of texts 
and images sympathetic to Russia-based opposition movements, it appeared that 
these groups had much less genuine support in Tajikistan than they wanted 
people to believe. Most of these texts and images were posted, shared, and 
discussed by a small group of users with uncommon names and strange profile 
pictures, which indicates that there was little genuine interest in or support for 
these opposition movements among Tajikistani social media users. 
The overall mood amongst online users in August was that the outcome of the elections was foretold. Few users even 
entertained the possibility of the incumbent’s defeat at the polls. The amount of attention paid to elections began to rise in late 
August, following reports that a coalition consisting of the two main opposition parties, IRPT and SPT, was negotiating a 
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unity candidate who could challenge Emomali 
Rahmon at the polls. The surprise announcement 
on September 9 that the coalition group had 
nominated Oinikhol Bobonazarova, a female 
human rights activist, as their unity candidate 
became a major hit with the social media.  
The buzz generated by the announcement could 
be divided into three main strands of discussion. 
One strand centered on the argument about 
whether Bobonazarova’s nomination was a sign of 
the weakness of political opposition in Tajikistan 
or a smart strategy on their part. The second 
discussion focused on whether voters in Tajikistan 
would support a female candidate.3 The third strand of the debate centered on the political aptitude of the incumbent president, 
with some users ridiculing him and the way his government was administering the elections4 while others argued that he was a 
better option than the other possible contenders.5 These conversations, using both texts and images, dominated political 
discussion in social media through most of September and the first days of October. 
The second major albeit less intensive buzz in the social media was sparked by Bobonazarova’s October 11 announcement that 
she was pulling out of the presidential contest after failing to collect the required amount of signatures in support of her 
candidacy. Although few users believed that she could have made a serious challenge to Rahmon’s re-election bid, many seemed 
genuinely disappointed by Bobonazarova’s departure from the race.6 The general mood among the users was that the contest 
had become much “less interesting” without Bobonazarova who had harshly criticized Rahmon and his government.7 On 
Facebook and Odnoklassniki, some members called for a 
boycott of the November 6 vote,8 although it appeared that 
these calls came predominantly from the same individuals who 
supported Quvvatov and other Tajikistani opposition leaders in 
exile. Several days after Bobonazarova had pulled out of the 
presidential contest the amount of elections-related discussion 
in social media began to fade. 
Overall, during the period under observation, Rahmon and 
Bobonazarova were the only presidential candidates who drew 
the attention of social media users. Following Bobonazarova’s 
departure from the race, Rahmon remained the only candidate 
in the online political landscape. Out of the remaining five 
candidates registered by the election authorities, only the 
candidate from the Socialist Party (SPT) drew some attention 
from Tajikistani social media users, primarily as a target of 
mockery. The complete absence online of the five presidential 
hopefuls running against Rahmon indicates how little the 
public in Tajikistan knows about these candidates or takes 
them seriously. 
“Presidential candidate Abduhalim Gafforov, head of the 
Socialist Party of Tajikistan”. He is portrayed as saying: “Our 
motto is: Vote for Rahmon!”. Image uploaded by ‘Umniy Biznes'. 
In the photo, Bobonazarova tells Rahmon, “Ask the people to forgive you”. 
Rahmon answers, “Teacher, I will not behave like that again. I am sorry, I 
apologize”. Image uploaded by ‘Moderator Platformy’ Photos are from the 
group ”Platforma:” https://www.facebook.com/groups/platformatj/  
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Conclusion 
This analysis of the election-related discussion that took place during the three months running up to the November 2013 
presidential vote in Tajikistan leads me to several conclusions. First, the public in Tajikistan has little doubt that President 
Emomali Rahmon will win the elections, and there appears to be genuine support for him among some voters. Second, 
Oinikhol Bobonazarova, who drew considerable attention and support in Tajikistan, was the only presidential hopeful whose 
bid to challenge the incumbent leader. Third, Bobonazarova’s departure from the race essentially made Rahmon the only 
player in the elections game, as the public had little knowledge of the other five candidates.  
Fourth, Tajikistani opposition movements 
in exile have recently increased their 
profile in the social media in an apparent 
attempt to mobilize support from among 
young adults critical of Rahmon’s 
government. These movements, however, 
still lack broad-based backing in the 
country. This analysis provides the most 
accurate picture of public opinion in 
Tajikistan in the run-up to the presidential 
vote. Although there are still issues with 
treating social media as a reliable indicator 
of public opinion, it is arguably the most 
accurate indicator in a country like 
Tajikistan.  
“You decide which one of them will become president”. Image uploaded by Artyom 
Geyvandov.  
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